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INTRODUCTION 
Bureaucrat-bashing is an old and popular sport in the United 
States. Indeed, complaints about “faceless bureaucrats” and “soulless 
technocrats” are so common that they have become part of the 
background noise of our political discourse.1 Some of this anti-
bureaucratic impulse seems motivated by a hostility to “big 
government,” with critics deriding civil servants as clumsy, 
overzealous, or even sinister meddlers in private affairs.2 Another line 
 
 * Eli Goldston Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to 
Jody Freeman, Jack Goldsmith, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Daphna Renan, and Cass 
Sunstein for helpful comments. 
 1. Ulf Zimmermann, Democracy and Bureaucracy in the U.S., in 
PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN AND TEXAS POLITICS 287, 287 (Kent L. Tedin et al. eds., 
3d ed. 1992); David Brooks, The Enlightenment Project, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2017, 
at A23; see also, e.g., R. Sam Garrett et al., Assessing the Impact of Bureaucracy 
Bashing by Electoral Campaigns, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 228, 228 (2006); Herbert 
Kaufman, Fear of Bureaucracy: A Raging Pandemic, 41 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 1, 1 
(1981); Dean Yarwood, Stop Bashing the Bureaucracy, 56 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 611, 
611 (1996). 
 2. Editorial, What the Founders Can Teach Us, INV. BUS. DAILY, July 2, 
1998, at A28. See generally, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: PRIVATE 
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of attack depicts government bureaucrats as “captured” by special 
interests—often the industry or sector those bureaucrats are supposed 
to regulate.3 Other critiques of career bureaucrats emphasize their lack 
of political accountability and insufficient responsiveness to the “will 
of the people.”4 Recent right-wing paranoia over an alleged “deep 
state” is a particularly pathological version of this view, but milder 
forms have long been found across the political spectrum.5 And then 
there’s the hoary old stereotype of government bureaucrats as lazy 
empire-builders (which seems a touch oxymoronic).6 On this account, 
civil servants seek to maximize their budgets and their power, while 
minimizing their work and resisting any changes that would disrupt 
their comfortable routines.7 
I trust most readers are familiar with these stereotypes. Like 
many stereotypes, they may have a kernel of truth. Government 
bureaucrats are imperfect human beings, and public bureaucracies are 
imperfect human institutions. But these caricatures of “faceless 
bureaucrats” and “soulless technocrats” convey a distorted and 
misleading picture of how our government actually works, and of who 
 
PROPERTY, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2011) (detailing the rise 
of anti-bureaucrat pushback in response to the expansion of American progressivism). 
 3. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure 
Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a 
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 217 (1976); George J. 
Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971). 
 4. See, e.g., THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND 
REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 311 (2d ed. 1979); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2336 (2001). 
 5. See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1653, 1653–54 (2018); Rebecca Ingber, The “Deep State” Myth and the Real 
Executive Branch Bureaucracy, LAWFARE (June 14, 2017, 11:52 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/deep-state-myth-and-real-executive-branch-
bureaucracy [https://perma.cc/88KK-WEYW]. The term “deep state” was originally 
coined to describe the national security apparatus that held real power in nominally 
democratic regimes like Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan; in the United States context, the 
term is sometimes used more narrowly to describe an (alleged) network of national 
security bureaucrats who are able to use secretly collected intelligence information to 
influence the decisions of elected officials. Jack Goldsmith, Paradoxes of the Deep 
State, in CAN IT HAPPEN HERE?: AUTHORITARIANISM IN AMERICA 105, 106–07 (Cass 
R. Sunstein ed., 2018). However, during the Trump Administration, the term has been 
deployed in a much more sweeping fashion to describe (and often to deride) career 
civil servants throughout the government who are seen as resisting the President’s 
agenda. See id. at 120. 
 6. See KENNETH NEWTON & JAN W. VAN DETH, FOUNDATIONS OF 
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 152–53 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2010). 
 7. See WILLIAM A. NISKANSEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY & REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 36–42 (1971). 
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these people actually are and what they know and do and care about. 
Of course, critiques of bureaucratic governance have hardly gone 
unchallenged. Many distinguished authors, from the New Deal period 
up through the present day, have advanced vigorous defenses of the 
administrative state.8 Yet even in these accounts, the qualities of the 
bureaucrats themselves—who they are, what they know, what they 
value—tend to fade into the background. 
My objective in this short Article is to provoke what I hope will 
be a more extended discussion by raising, and briefly exploring, two 
related ideas. First, the performance of our public bureaucracies 
depends in significant part on the characteristics (skills, capacities, 
values, etc.) of the individuals who staff those bureaucracies. Second, 
our legal, institutional, or political choices influence the sorts of public 
servants we get, and thereby influence how well or poorly our 
government operates. In a nutshell, my main argument is that a well-
designed bureaucratic system is one that, among other things, attracts, 
retains, and empowers the right sort of people. This point may seem 
obvious, even trivial, and in a sense it is. I certainly make no claim to 
wholesale originality. Many political scientists, legal scholars, and 
other commentators have explored the themes I will pursue here, and 
I am indebted to their work.9 My modest goal in this Article is to pull 
together a few of the various threads of the existing literature to make 
a series of arguments about the interrelationship between the quality 
 
 8. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1–2 (Yale 
Univ. Press 1938); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: 
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 160–61 (Harvard Univ. Press 1990); Gillian 
E. Metzger, Foreword, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (2017); David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case 
for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 99–100 (2000).  
 9. See generally, e.g., SEAN GAILMARD & JOHN W. PATTY, LEARNING WHILE 
GOVERNING: EXPERTISE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (2013); 
HERBERT A. KAUFMAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL BUREAU CHIEFS 
(1981); HERBERT A. KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
BEHAVIOR (1960); DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: 
POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE (2008); JAMES G. MARCH & 
HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1993); David J. Barron, From Takeover 
to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1095 (2008); George A. Krause & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Loyalty-
Competence Trade-offs for Top U.S. Federal Bureaucratic Leaders in the 
Administrative Presidency Era, 49 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 527 (2019); George A. 
Krause & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Experiential Learning and the Presidential 
Management of the U.S. Federal Bureaucracy: Logic and Evidence from Agency 
Leadership Appointments, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 914 (2016); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian 
Vermuele, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032 (2011). 
1180 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
of the public service and the qualities of the public servants who staff 
it—a discussion that I hope will serve as a reminder that bureaucrats 
have faces, technocrats have souls, and the values and capabilities that 
these flesh-and-blood human beings bring to their jobs may matter 
more for the quality of our government than is often appreciated. 
The Article proceeds in two parts. Part I sketches the reasons 
why the quality of public servants matters, and the qualities we would 
most want to see in those public servants. Some of the points here are 
obvious and uncontroversial, but others may be less so. In particular, 
I argue that we should want to attract and empower bureaucrats who 
are not only technically competent, but who can function as an 
effective counterweight to their agency’s politically-appointed 
leadership and its overseers in the White House and Congress. Part II 
then considers how factors over which politicians and other 
institutional designers (perhaps including courts) may have some 
control can influence the kinds of civil servants we get, and the 
consequences for overall public sector performance. Here there may 
be some uncomfortable tradeoffs, which should be front and center in 
any serious conversation about understanding, and possibly 
improving, how our government works. 
I. HOW THE MAKEUP OF OUR PUBLIC SERVICE AFFECTS THE 
PERFORMANCE OF OUR GOVERNMENT 
The administrative state is inevitable. Questions about its proper 
size, scope, and role will always be with us, but at this point nobody, 
except perhaps the most deluded libertarian fantasist, imagines that we 
could or should get along without a large federal bureaucracy. That 
bureaucracy is staffed by millions of people, with a wide range of jobs 
and levels of responsibility, in a vast array of agencies, bureaus, 
commissions, and departments. And these people are generally the 
ones responsible for crafting and carrying into effect the rules, 
regulations, orders, and directives that make up much of our public 
policy. Therefore, it ought to be self-evident that the type of people 
who staff this large and powerful bureaucracy will have a significant 
impact on the quality of our government. 
So, speaking at a very high level of generality, what qualities 
ought we to look for in our professional civil servants?10 What kinds 
 
 10. A potential important caveat or clarification: Throughout this Article I 
use, more or less interchangeably, terms like “civil servant,” “public servant,” and 
“bureaucrat.” I have in mind mainly unelected officials below the most senior level, 
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of bureaucrats would make for a good bureaucracy? I will emphasize 
four qualities, each of which can be thought of as an aspect of 
something we might call, for lack of a better term, “professionalism.” 
The first two qualities—competence and integrity—are obvious and 
probably uncontroversial. The third—which I will call 
“commitment”—is a dedication to the avowed goals and priorities of 
the agency for which the bureaucrat works. Emphasizing the 
desirability of committed bureaucrats may strike some as odd, given 
that much of the existing literature frets about excessive levels of 
mission-commitment (sometimes derided as “overzealousness” or 
“tunnel vision”), framing this as a problem that our institutions are 
supposed to solve.11 But as I will argue below, while an excess of 
mission-commitment might indeed be a problem, a deficit of such 
commitment is also undesirable. The fourth quality I will highlight 
might be called “propriety”—placing value not only on doing the right 
thing, but on doing things the right way. (In other contexts “propriety” 
is largely synonymous with “integrity,” but here I use the term 
“integrity” to describe a public servant’s honesty, while by “propriety” 
I mean something more like a commitment to correct procedures that 
goes beyond honesty per se.) Here too the literature has traditionally 
emphasized the downsides of excessive propriety, criticizing the 
(allegedly) stultifying bureaucratic fixation on standard operating 
procedures, routines, and the like.12 But in pointing out these 
pathologies, much of the existing commentary has exaggerated their 
 
but some of what I have to say would apply to officials at, for example, the deputy or 
assistant level. The line between “career” civil servants and “political appointees” can 
get blurry, especially when senior posts in a department are filled by individuals who 
have a long history working in that department at lower levels. Some of the discussion 
in this Article will be relevant for more senior political appointees, while other points 
will be less relevant. Rather than trying to develop a typology of public servants or to 
tease out the applicability of each individual argument to different types of 
government officials, this Article speaks in broader terms, sacrificing a degree of 
nuance in favor of greater simplicity and economy. 
 11. STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD 
EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 10–19 (1993); see also ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE 
BUREAUCRACY 107 (1967); Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White 
House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1081 (1986). 
 12. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, 
Decisionmaking, and Accountability, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 434 (2006); Randall P. 
Bezahson, The Myths of Formalism: An Essay on Our Faith that Formalism Yields 
Fairness and Effectiveness in Public Administration, 69 IOWA L. REV. 957, 957 
(1984); Edward L. Rubin, Bureaucratic Oppression: Its Causes and Cures, 90 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 291, 314–15 (2012). 
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significance relative to the benefits of staffing bureaucracies with 
people who are punctilious about doing things in the proper way. 
Let me say a bit more about each of these four dimensions of 
what I am calling “bureaucratic professionalism,” starting with 
competence, defined broadly and admittedly somewhat loosely as the 
ability to perform certain tasks effectively and efficiently. 
Competence is the quality of our public servants that most obviously 
affects the overall performance of our government institutions. After 
all, the most familiar and pervasive justification for delegation of 
substantial policymaking authority to bureaucratic agents is that they 
have superior expertise.13 Some of this expertise is technical—we want 
economists who are good at economics, epidemiologists who know a 
lot about epidemiology, lawyers who are skillful legal advocates, and 
so forth. But these are not the only kinds of expertise that are 
important. Many civil servants, especially at more senior levels, have 
broader managerial responsibilities, and so at this level we also want 
people who have a distinct sort of managerial expertise.14 Now, lest I 
be accused of committing the so-called “fallacy of composition”15—
assuming that a collective entity has the same attributes as its 
components—let me hasten to acknowledge that the competence of a 
bureaucracy may differ from the competence of the individual 
bureaucrats who staff it. An agency could be so badly designed that it 
acts stupidly even if most of the people who staff it are quite smart. It 
is also possible, though perhaps less likely, that a sufficiently clever 
institutional design could optimally leverage the talents of even a 
mediocre agency staff so as to produce high-quality agency decisions. 
But on the whole, it seems more probable that the quality of 
bureaucratic outputs will be strongly and positively correlated with the 
competence of the bureaucrats tasked with doing much of the agency’s 
work. 
The reasons for wanting civil servants who have job-relevant 
expertise may be obvious, but it is worth noting that there are a number 
of different characteristics that contribute to the expertise of any given 
bureaucrat. The most straightforward are raw talent (intelligence, 
energy, focus) and job-specific knowledge and training. These are 
 
 13. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Statutory Interpretation by Agencies, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 285, 287–88 (Daniel A. 
Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). 
 14. See Krause & O’Connell, Loyalty-Competence Trade-offs, supra note 9, 
at 533–34. 
 15. JOHN J. MACKIE, Fallacies, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 169, 172–
73 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967). 
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related but not the same, and there may sometimes be a trade-off 
between these two aspects of competence. Moreover, there are also 
other personal characteristics that may matter quite a bit to a given 
bureaucrat’s overall competence at her job. Consider, for example, the 
importance of on-the-job experience and the associated acquisition of 
specialized skills. The people who are most likely to acquire that sort 
of experience are those who are interested in staying in their roles for 
a significant period of time, as opposed to those who plan to pursue 
new career opportunities in relatively short order. Relatedly, acquiring 
the right sort of expertise, and doing the job well, may also involve 
effort. This is true of just about all jobs, but in a setting where the 
remuneration is lower, finding people with the intrinsic motivation to 
work hard at mastering their jobs may be critical to promoting 
competence. Thus bureaucratic competence is the product not only of 
raw ability and training, but also of commitment to the job (the third 
quality in my list, to be discussed more in a moment). 
In addition to competence, another obvious quality one would 
want in a government bureaucrat is integrity. Although outright 
corruption is not as much of an issue in the U.S. federal bureaucracy 
as it is elsewhere, the issue does come up occasionally.16 And while 
the integrity of the bureaucracy is partly a function of the laws and 
institutions that influence the incentives of bureaucrats after they 
assume their posts (for example, things like anticorruption laws, 
conflict-of-interest rules, civil service salaries, and the like), 
individuals also vary in their degree of personal integrity, and those 
who are more honest before they join public service tend to be more 
honest once they are entrusted with a public service job.17 So, a well-
designed bureaucracy is one that not only creates incentives to act 
honestly, but that also tends to select and promote civil servants with 
high integrity while weeding out those who are more corruptible. 
Competence and integrity are qualities we would want in our 
bureaucrats—and our bureaucracies—even if all we expected of them 
was to translate the policy decisions, or general policy priorities, of 
our elected representatives into concrete regulations, rulings, and 
enforcement decisions. On that “transmission belt” conception of the 
 
 16. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND 
OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2018 (2019) 22–24 (presenting 
data on, among other things, federal public officials charged with and convicted of 
public corruption offenses). 
 17. See generally Rema Hanna & Shing-Yi Wang, Dishonesty and Selection 
into Public Service: Evidence from India, 9 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 262 (2017) 
(presenting evidence supporting this point from outside the United States). 
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bureaucracy, value choices ought to be made by elected 
representatives, or at the very least by the high-level officials whom 
elected officials appoint and directly oversee, while the career civil 
servants ought to apply their technical, managerial, and other expertise 
to translate those values and priorities into specific regulatory 
decisions.18 On this view, questions of value, or of managing hard 
trade-offs among competing interests, are—to use a common 
metaphor that is especially apt here—above the civil servants’ pay 
grade. If one accepts the transmission belt view, then the other main 
qualities we should look for in our professional civil servants would 
be things like loyalty to their political masters, along with a sense of 
humility—qualities that translate into a willingness to dutifully carry 
out policy choices made at a higher level. Indeed, on this view civil 
servants are not supposed to have their own distinctive policy views 
at all, and the fact that they do is the inevitable but unfortunate 
consequence of the fact that bureaucrats are human beings. 
But the professional civil service performs additional valuable 
functions in our system, functions that are distinct from—and indeed 
in considerable tension with—the transmission belt model of the 
bureaucracy. In particular, there is value to having civil servants with 
a sufficiently strong sense of professional autonomy that they both can 
play and want to play a more active role in the policymaking process, 
a role that goes beyond simply applying their technical competence to 
translate the choices and priorities of elected officials into concrete 
policy. Bureaucrats can—and often should—influence the agency 
decision-making process (within legal limits). 
There are a few reasons why this sort of more active role for the 
civil service may be desirable and why we should not fully embrace 
the “transmission belt”/“faithful agent” conception of civil servants’ 
proper role even if that vision could be fully implemented. First, and 
perhaps most important, the more active involvement of career civil 
servants—acting with some degree of autonomy and input, whether 
formal or informal—may help make the administrative policymaking 
process less politicized. That sentence is likely to set off alarm bells 
for those worried about “unaccountable bureaucra[ts].”19 The concern 
is not wholly misplaced, and I will have more to say about it in just a 
moment, but before proceeding I want to address another common 
 
 18. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1675 (1975). 
 19. Steven G. Calabresi, The Revitalization of Democracy in the New 
Millennium, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 151, 152 (2000). 
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critique of proposals that seek to “depoliticize” the administrative 
decision-making process. 
That critique runs as follows: Complaints that a given regulatory 
decision was “political,” or that the decision-making process has been 
“politicized,” are misplaced because administrative policymaking is 
inevitably political; the idea that regulatory decisions could be made 
simply by applying “neutral expert[ise]” is a New Deal-era myth that 
may never even have existed then, and has certainly been buried 
now.20 That critique is misguided in two respects. First, though of less 
importance for present purposes, the claim that politics will always 
have some role in administrative decisions does not refute claims that, 
in a given context, politics may play too much of a role. Second, and 
of greater significance here, the critique conflates two different senses 
of the term “political.” One sense of “political” means, essentially, 
normative: there are competing values at stake, and so making a 
decision requires not only knowing empirical facts about the world but 
also making value-laden choices about what would be best for the 
polity. Virtually all important administrative decisions are “political” 
in that sense. But there is a second sense in which we sometimes say 
that a particular decision or decision-making process is “political,” a 
sense is closer to “partisan.” A decision might be motivated not so 
much by a conclusion that it would be best for the polity but rather by 
a calculation that the decision would be in the interests of the current 
government (or of an individual politician), perhaps because it would 
be broadly popular in the short term (regardless of its ultimate merits), 
or perhaps because it would appease certain influential supporters. The 
rhetorical trick, which really is so obvious that we should all stop 
falling for it, is to respond to concerns that a given administrative 
decision or decision-making process was “political” in this second 
sense (that is, partisan) by pointing out that administrative decisions 
are inevitably and properly “political” in the first sense (that is, 
concerned with value trade-offs). When I say here that semi-
autonomous career civil servants can reduce the “politicization” of 
administrative decisions, and that this would be a good thing, I am 
referring to politicization in the parochial, partisan sense. 
When I suggest that semi-autonomous civil servants can resist 
the politicization of bureaucratic decision-making, what do I have in 
 
 20. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 1276, 1331–34 (1984); see also Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency 
Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Administration, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2025–26 (2015). 
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mind? Political actors (directly or through their high-level appointees) 
may pressure bureaucrats—explicitly or implicitly—to reach results 
that would be politically advantageous, even if they would not be in 
the public interest. Bureaucrats can either accede to or resist such 
pressure. That resistance can take a variety of forms, and at least the 
legitimate ones do not involve any overstepping of appropriate 
bounds, legal or otherwise.21 For example, bureaucrats tasked with 
performing a cost-benefit analysis of a proposed regulation can write 
a report that best reflects what the bureaucrats think is the “right 
answer” (on technical grounds), rather than slanting the analysis so 
that it produces the result that their political overseers want. Likewise, 
when asked to evaluate a range of regulatory options head-to-head, 
bureaucrats can give their honest opinion rather than telling elected 
officials what they want to hear, and can create a paper trail to support 
their conclusion. Bureaucrats can set enforcement priorities within the 
bounds permitted by law and official policy that would best advance 
their agency’s mission, even if this involves bringing enforcement 
actions that would embarrass or annoy the government, or not 
pursuing cases that would embarrass the opposition.22 
Now it is true that career civil servants have their own political 
values, which may diverge not only from those of their immediate 
principals (the President, the President’s political appointees, and 
Congress), but also from those of the general public. To that extent, 
giving the bureaucracy influence over policy decisions may be 
“undemocratic.” And civil servants may also have partisan interests 
and biases, just as the rest of us do. I certainly would not advocate a 
system in which unelected bureaucrats get to make all, or even most, 
of the key decisions regarding policies, values, and priorities. Rather, 
 
 21. Here, I am deliberately bracketing the more fraught questions of whether 
or when bureaucrats might properly go outside legitimate channels and perhaps break, 
or at least bend, the law to influence policy decisions—for example, by leaking 
sensitive information or threatening to do so. For an insightful discussion of these 
questions in the national security context, see generally Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 
105. 
 22. To be clear, I am not focusing on situations in which bureaucrats have 
been asked to undertake or participate in activities they believe are illegal or grossly 
unethical. The challenges associated with that setting—whether to stay or to resign, 
whether or how to report through formal channels, or whether to leak to the press or 
the opposition—have long been considered and debated, and these issues have taken 
on even greater prominence in the Trump Administration. See, e.g., Oona Hathaway 
& Sarah Weiner, Dissenting from Within the Trump Administration, JUST SECURITY 
(Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/36420/dissenting-trump-administration/ 
[https://perma.cc/B5HM-DLJC]. But I do not explore those fraught problems here. 
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I am suggesting that there is a trade-off: Giving the professional civil 
service more influence over policy decisions may exacerbate the 
“democratic deficit” in administrative policymaking, but at the same 
time doing so may reduce the degree to which administrative 
policymaking is politicized in the bad, partisan sense. The challenge 
is striking the right balance. Yet the existing literature has tended to 
focus overwhelmingly (though not exclusively) on one side of the 
equation, obsessing over the possibility of excessive bureaucratic 
“tunnel vision” and “mission orientation,” while emphasizing the idea 
that the President—or offices close to the President, like the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs—have a superior democratic 
pedigree and are likely to take a broader, more “synoptic” view of 
policy.23 There may be some truth to this, but in focusing so much on 
this aspect of the problem, commentators may have developed their 
own kind of tunnel vision, failing to recognize that there are risks in 
the other direction too. Contrary to stereotypes, the people who work 
at regulatory agencies may have policy priorities that are not too far 
from those of most members of the general public, and the greater risk 
of distortion may often come from elected politicians (or their 
surrogates) placing a higher priority on reaching policy decisions that 
will confer partisan or other political advantages. 
A second consideration, one that is perhaps a variant on the idea 
that a semi-autonomous career civil service can help “depoliticize” 
administrative policymaking, is that the bureaucratic inertia—often 
decried in pathological terms as “sclerosis” and “ossification”—can 
help moderate what might otherwise be wild swings in administrative 
policy following changes in partisan control of the White House. 
Nobody seriously contests the idea that the President ought to be able 
to set policy and priorities for the administration, and there is a strong 
political accountability argument for enabling the President to exert 
substantial control over the bureaucracy. Yet in an era where the major 
parties’ platforms are very far apart but national elections are almost 
always extremely close, very small changes in vote distributions or 
turnout, which may be determined by factors having little to do with 
the candidates’ policy platforms, can lead to gigantic swings in White 
House policy preferences. Insofar as the career bureaucracy tends to 
persist across administrations, and career bureaucrats are likely to 
have relatively more stable views of the right way to carry out their 
 
 23. See John D. Graham & James Broughel, Stealth Regulation: Addressing 
Agency Evasion of OIRA and the Administrative Procedure Act, 1 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 30, 35 (2014); see also Kagan, supra note 4, at 2336–37, 2384. 
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agencies’ responsibilities, a more active bureaucratic role in the 
policymaking process will tend to dampen the magnitude of the policy 
swings that follow changes in partisan control of the presidency. And 
notwithstanding the truism that “elections have consequences,” this 
moderating influence may be in the interest of a majority of the 
electorate, at least most of the time.24 
A third reason that we might embrace, at least to a certain extent, 
a more active role for career civil servants in the policymaking process 
comes into play if we embrace an “interest representation” model of 
the administrative process.25 Just as much of our constitutional theory 
assumes that Congress has interests that transcend the partisan or 
political interests of individual Members of Congress, and that the 
Presidency has interests that may not always correspond to the 
interests of an individual President, so too we might recognize that 
bureaucratic agencies have institutional interests that ought to be 
represented in the policymaking process. Now, the analogy is inapt in 
one important respect: unlike the three official branches of the U.S. 
federal government, the various entities that make up the federal 
bureaucracy do not have the same elevated constitutional status.26 But 
that does not mean that many of the normative arguments for 
representing institutional interests in the push and pull of the 
policymaking process do not apply to the institutional bureaucracy, in 
much the same way as these arguments apply to the institutional 
presidency or the institutional Congress. For example, when the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) makes enforcement decisions (whether 
about general priorities or about a specific case), it may be useful to 
ensure that some of the people involved in making those decisions are 
thinking about how they might affect the DOJ’s long-term institutional 
interests. While the Attorney General and other high-level political 
appointees may think along those lines to some extent, it is more likely 
that senior career DOJ lawyers, who serve across administrations, 
would give voice to those institutional interests in internal discussions. 
If we want civil servants who will be actively involved in policy 
formation, and in particular civil servants who will resist politicization 
and represent their agency’s institutional interests, what qualities 
 
 24. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the 
Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 53 (2008). 
 25. Stewart, supra note 18, at 1760–62. 
 26. This is not to say that the Constitution does not envision a federal 
bureaucracy of some kind—it clearly does. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 
(referencing “Officer[s]” and “Department[s]” of the U.S. government); id. art. II, § 
2, cl. 1 (same).  
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would we want those civil servants to have? As I noted above, one 
quality we might look for is commitment to the agency’s mission, or 
more generally a commitment to the values that the agency purports 
to stand for. This does not mean that we want civil servants dedicated 
to the single-minded pursuit of one particular goal (say, environmental 
quality), come hell or high water, regardless of costs. But we likely do 
want (to continue with this example) an Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) staffed by people who care about environmental 
protection and who elevate the achievement of the agency’s mission 
over, say, partisan loyalties or other ideological commitments. 
Another quality that is important in our bureaucrats—if we want 
them to play this role as semi-autonomous resisters of partisan 
pressure—is what I have termed a sense of “propriety,” an intrinsic 
value placed on doing things in the right way. There are two senses of 
propriety that are relevant here. One is propriety in the professional 
sense of executing professional tasks in the proper manner. For an 
economist, this might mean analyzing economic data in the way one 
would if one were writing a paper for a professional academic journal. 
For a lawyer, this might mean giving legal advice that represents one’s 
best understanding of the law, according to the accepted norms and 
practices of legal interpretation. A second sense of propriety, also 
important, is more specific to the bureaucratic setting: a commitment 
to following standard procedures and going through the proper 
channels, unless there is a very good reason not to. These two senses 
of propriety are distinct, and in some contexts might be in some 
tension, but I group them here because they both involve a willingness 
to subordinate the desire to reach a particular outcome to adherence to 
certain ideas about how the evaluation and decision process ought to 
proceed. 
What kinds of people are most likely to exhibit the strong senses 
of commitment and propriety that I have embraced? There is likely no 
definitive set of criteria, but a few characteristics naturally suggest 
themselves. First, we would want bureaucrats who have a strong sense 
of identification with—and concern over their reputation with—their 
professional community, be it the community of economists, 
scientists, doctors, lawyers, or what have you. Relatedly, we would 
want civil servants who prioritize the “craft” values associated with 
their work, as well as norms of proper professional conduct. My 
working hypothesis is that bureaucrats with these qualities are more 
likely to resist pressure to reach certain politically expedient 
conclusions that would require them to depart from strongly held 
professional norms. In contrast, individuals who are more concerned 
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about their reputation with a partisan political audience than with their 
professional community are less likely to care about mission-
commitment or professional propriety, and therefore are likely to be 
more concerned with whether the results they reach fit with a political 
or ideological agenda. (There is, however, at least the possibility for 
an internal tension here. An individual who is passionate about an 
agency’s mission—say, environmental protection—may exhibit 
higher levels of commitment to that mission, which I have argued may 
be a good thing, but such a committed individual might also be less 
concerned about strict adherence to certain norms, such as rigorous 
data analysis, that would be expected in a professional setting.) 
Another relevant consideration may be whether a given 
bureaucrat is a long-term public sector employee, or instead is a short-
termer likely to move on to other things. Here the implications for 
commitment and propriety are less clear, and may cut in different 
directions. For example, a career bureaucrat may have a stronger sense 
of identification with the agency and its mission, but might care less 
about her reputation with a professional community from which she 
may feel less directly connected. 
To sum up, and speaking at a very high level of generality, we’re 
likely to get a better public bureaucracy when we staff it with 
bureaucrats who are competent, honest, and committed both to the 
agency’s mission and to norms of propriety. In short, we want 
bureaucrats who exhibit a high degree of professionalism, on multiple 
dimensions. Now, my list of criteria is likely incomplete. (For 
example, one potentially important quality that may not quite fit into 
the four I have laid out here is “good judgment,” which some suggest 
is distinct from technical or managerial competence.) I certainly make 
no claims to comprehensiveness. That said, my omission of some 
qualities, such as “loyalty,” is deliberate. While “loyalty” may be a 
desirable quality in a senior political appointee, whose job it is to 
represent and advocate for the views of the President (or perhaps some 
other principal), this sort of partisan, ideological, or personal loyalty 
is not something that we want to see in our career civil servants. In 
lieu of loyalty, some might argue for the importance a related but 
milder quality, perhaps something like “humility” or “knowing one’s 
place”—an appropriate understanding that one’s narrow field of 
expertise does not include everything that might be relevant to a public 
policy question, and that in the end the responsibility to decide hard 
questions of values and priorities falls to elected representatives. I 
would accept that, and I acknowledge that bureaucratic hubris or 
insubordination could indeed be problems. But I do not emphasize 
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those issues here, because they seem to me less significant relative to 
the amount of attention they have already attracted in the literature and 
public commentary. 
II. HOW POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONS AFFECT THE MAKEUP OF OUR 
PUBLIC SERVICE 
If we agree that it is important to recruit and retain civil servants 
characterized by competence, integrity, commitment, and propriety, 
what follows? In this section, I will sketch a few preliminary ideas—
some obvious, others perhaps less so—about how institutional, legal, 
and policy choices might improve or worsen the quality of the 
bureaucracy along these various dimensions. I will group these factors 
into three broad categories: (1) institutions relating to the appointment, 
promotion, and removal of civil servants; (2) monetary and non-
monetary compensation of civil servants (things like salary, working 
conditions, and factors affecting morale); and (3) issues related to the 
so-called “revolving door”—movement between government and the 
private or nonprofit sector. 
A. Appointment, Promotion, and Removal 
The rules and institutions that most obviously and directly affect 
the makeup of the civil service are those related to the appointment, 
promotion, and removal of bureaucrats. 
With respect to hiring and promotion, the most fundamental 
decision concerns the degree to which civil service hiring and 
promotion is driven by political actors, as contrasted with a more 
formalized, bureaucratized, and “meritocratic” system. In the current 
U.S. federal system, public sector appointments are done through a 
mix of political and bureaucratic processes. Typically, the more senior 
the position, the greater the involvement of political actors. That is 
probably as it should be; the question is one of the proper degree and 
extent of political influence on hiring at various levels. It would be 
possible to have a system that is close to a purely party-controlled 
appointment process, something along the lines of a patronage system. 
It would also be possible to have a much more politically insulated 
civil service, with only a limited role for political influence on 
appointments below the very top level. And in between these extremes 
are a whole range of intermediate options. 
What are the consequences of a more political appointments 
process for the four core values emphasized in Part I (competence, 
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integrity, mission-commitment, propriety)? A plausible first-cut 
hypothesis is that the average politically-appointed bureaucrat will 
likely be worse along all of these dimensions, for the simple reason 
that political actors are likely to prioritize other things, like partisan 
loyalty or ideological fealty, when making appointments. 
Furthermore, partisan loyalty and a strong sense of professional 
propriety may often be in tension, as the former prioritizes results over 
process while the latter prioritizes process over results. Moreover, 
even when there is no direct trade-off, in practice it is inevitable that 
when focusing on one set of characteristics, performance on other 
dimensions is worse: All else equal, politicians usually prefer a more 
competent bureaucrat to a less competent bureaucrat, but if they care 
more about ideology than competence, they will at least sometimes 
end up appointing or promoting a less competent but ideologically 
congruent candidate over a more competent but ideologically suspect 
candidate.27 Again, that is not necessarily a bad thing, especially at the 
more senior leadership levels, but on the whole it seems likely that 
giving partisan political actors a stronger say in bureaucratic 
appointments will tend to select for bureaucrats who are, on average, 
less competent and (perhaps) less honest, with a weaker sense of 
commitment to the agency’s mission (as opposed to their patron’s 
political agenda), and less devotion to norms of propriety. 
That hypothesis, though, is based on an important implicit 
assumption that needs to be brought to the surface and scrutinized 
more closely: The assumption is that in a professional, bureaucratic, 
and (allegedly) meritocratic appointment and promotion system, civil 
servants will be selected for one or more of the qualities advocated 
here. This is by no means inevitable. Indeed, it is not entirely clear 
how much or how well real-world bureaucratic selection systems 
prioritize these values. The one that is most likely given high priority 
in existing systems is competence, or at least those aspects of 
competence that are easiest to measure through credentials, 
experience, and (in cases of exam-based recruitment and promotion 
systems) test scores. Selection for managerial competence is trickier, 
and it is possible that political selection systems may actually do 
somewhat better on this dimension, at least in those cases where 
 
 27. See Krause & O’Connell, Loyalty-Competence Trade-offs, supra note 9, 
at 533–34. Of course, a politician would ideally like to appoint someone who is both 
extremely competent and loyal to and ideologically aligned with the politician herself, 
and sometimes the politician may be able to find such an ideal candidate. The point 
here is not that there is always a tradeoff between competence and loyalty, but that 
there often is. 
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politicians are more likely to appoint people with significant public or 
private sector management experience.28 Integrity is much more 
difficult to measure at the hiring stage, though bureaucracies do try to 
do some degree of screening in the hopes of identifying candidates 
with high ethical standards. (At a minimum, thorough interviewing 
and background checks are meant to screen out the most worrisome 
cases.) 
What about the other desiderata emphasized here, mission-
commitment and propriety? These qualities, like integrity, are difficult 
to measure at the hiring stage, though perhaps doing so is feasible to 
some degree. These qualities might come into play more at the 
promotion stage, and here a system in which promotions are 
determined through an internal, semi-autonomous process might be 
more likely to emphasize these qualities, on the logic that career 
bureaucrats in management positions are more likely than politicians 
to place a high value on the agency’s mission and on professional 
norms and standard operating procedures. 
The upshot of this discussion is that, while there is a strong case 
to be made for the President, Congress, and other political actors 
taking the leading role in selecting an agency’s head and other senior 
leaders, one should be very careful before extrapolating from the 
democratic accountability argument for political appointments of 
senior leaders to the rest of the civil service. There are good reasons 
to think that a more non-political, routinized, and at least aspirationally 
meritocratic appointment and promotion system for the rest of the civil 
service has considerable advantages. Admittedly, taking a stand 
against Jacksonian-style patronage is not exactly a bold move in the 
early twenty-first century. Yet there are troubling signs that the 
enthusiasm for political appointments is getting out of control in some 
quarters, and we may see increasing pressure for sweeping an ever-
growing set of civil servants into the category for which a political 
appointment process is legally required.29 Doing so might increase a 
certain form of “democratic accountability,” but would come at a steep 
cost in terms of other values. 
 
 28. See id. (finding a substantially stronger trade-off between measures of 
political loyalty and policy expertise than between measures of political loyalty and 
managerial competence). 
 29. See Philip K. Howard, Civil Service Reform: Reassert the President’s 
Constitutional Authority, AM. INT. (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.the-american-
interest.com/2017/01/28/civil-service-reform-reassert-the-presidents-constitutional-
authority/ [https://perma.cc/G5GB-HQ9L]. 
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In addition to the question of how civil servants are appointed, 
there is also the question of how many civil servants are appointed. 
The size of the bureaucracy may correlate with the average quality of 
the bureaucrats, and if selection systems are approximately rational, 
aiming to select for the best available candidates, then this correlation 
will be negative. The reasoning is straightforward: Suppose the 
government wants to hire people for some important public job, say 
serving as border patrol agents or Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) investigators. If the government hires 500 people 
for these positions in a given year, it will presumably screen all the 
applications and take the best 500. If the government wants to increase 
the total manpower available for the relevant task, it can hire 1,000 
people instead of 500, but that means hiring 500 people who would 
not have been good enough to make the original cut. This observation 
that increasing quantity can dilute quality is as applicable in 
government as it is elsewhere. That does not mean that expanding total 
government staffing is always, or even usually, a bad idea. Depending 
on the context, the impact on quality might be negligible or 
substantially outweighed by the benefits of more manpower. But the 
relationship between the size of government bureaucracy and the need 
to compromise on various dimensions of quality must to be taken into 
account. 
In addition to the question of who can hire and promote civil 
servants—and the criteria they use when doing so—there is a related 
set of questions concerning the removal of civil servants. A well-
known and ongoing debate in U.S. constitutional law concerns 
whether or under what conditions Congress may limit the President’s 
ability to remove agency heads, and I do not have much to add to that 
debate here.30 But a related set of questions, concerning the appropriate 
and legitimate degree of tenure protection for other civil servants, has 
received substantially less attention. Tenure protections for civil 
servants have some well-known downsides, the most important of 
which relate to some of the qualities highlighted in this Article. Most 
notably, we want bureaucrats who are competent and honest, but 
tenure protections can make it more difficult to remove bureaucrats 
who lack one or both of those qualities.31 In addition, a system with 
strong tenure protections may select for the “wrong” sort of applicants. 
 
 30. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 566–605 (3d ed. 2017). 
 31. See DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW 
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 34 (1992). 
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Potential candidates who know they are highly capable, and who 
intend to work hard at their jobs, may care less about strong tenure 
protections because they are confident that they would not be fired 
even if they lacked those protections. Potential candidates who are less 
confident in their own abilities, or who lack a strong work ethic, may 
find jobs with strong tenure protections more attractive, precisely 
because they know they will not need to meet a high performance 
standard to retain their positions. Thus, when civil service jobs come 
with stronger tenure protections, the candidate pool may include a 
greater proportion of low-quality applicants looking for an easy life. 
Of course, as discussed above, this problem might be addressed by 
better screening at the front end, but such screening is never going to 
be perfect. 
So, tenure protections might undermine average bureaucratic 
competence or integrity. That said, tenure protections for civil servants 
have a number of advantages, some well-known, others perhaps 
underappreciated. First, although tenure protections can reduce the 
average competence of bureaucrats if these protections make it hard 
for the agency’s leadership to fire those who are bad at their jobs, 
tenure protections might increase average bureaucratic competence 
through other channels. For starters, secure tenure is a form of non-
monetary compensation that can make public service jobs at least 
somewhat more competitive with private sector jobs, thus making it 
easier to attract competent people to the public sector. The private 
sector will usually pay more, sometimes a lot more, for talented 
individuals, but a private sector job is also riskier, with more 
uncertainty and instability. The pay cut a talented person takes by 
choosing the public sector over the private sector hurts a bit less if the 
public sector job comes with reduced uncertainty about long-term 
employment stability. And while it is possible that the increased job 
security will select for those with less confidence in their own ability, 
or a lower work ethic, it is also possible that it will mainly select for 
people who are more risk-averse, which does not seem like much of a 
problem (as there is no particular reason to believe that risk-aversion 
is negatively correlated with competence). By contrast, in a world 
where public sector employees do not have greater job security than 
private sector employees, but the latter earn dramatically higher 
salaries, it may be much harder to recruit and retain high-quality public 
servants. 
Another reason why civil service tenure protections might 
actually increase the average competence of public sector bureaucrats 
has to do with the fact, noted in Part I, that certain aspects of 
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bureaucratic competence come primarily from on-the-job investment 
in job-specific knowledge and expertise, aspects of which might not 
translate well into the private sector. A government bureaucrat who 
has security of tenure has a stronger incentive both to stay in public 
service for a longer period, and to invest time and effort in getting 
really good at those aspects of her government job that are not all that 
portable. A civil servant without security of tenure, who worries she 
could be removed at any time, may be more likely to look for exit 
options after a relatively short time in government, lest she end up 
unemployable in the private sector after investing many years or even 
decades in a public sector job that does not have a good private sector 
analogue. Now, this consideration may only apply to a subset of public 
servants. DOJ prosecutors will probably never have trouble finding 
high-paying jobs at private sector law firms, for example. But in other 
fields, security of tenure may be important to convincing capable 
people not only to take public sector jobs, but to stay in those jobs for 
long enough to get really good at them (or, as the economists might 
put it, to invest sufficient effort in developing job-specific human 
capital).32 
Yet another reason why tenure protections for civil servants may 
increase rather than decrease average bureaucratic competence relates 
to the previous discussion of patronage versus merit appointment at 
the hiring and promotion stage. The idea that tenure protections might 
undermine bureaucratic competence or integrity is premised on the 
idea that, in the absence of such protections, those who wield the 
removal power would be more likely to dismiss civil servants who are 
incompetent or dishonest. But what if those with the power to remove 
bureaucrats actually prioritize other factors, like partisan loyalty? In 
that case, stripping away tenure protections would not improve 
average bureaucratic competence, and might even worsen it—if, for 
example, the qualities that those with the dismissal power value most 
highly are negatively correlated with competence or honesty. Indeed, 
perhaps the most widely discussed benefits of civil service tenure 
protections relate to the ability of career civil servants to execute their 
responsibilities without fear of reprisals on political grounds. 
Thus, if we want civil servants who are not only honest and 
competent, but who have strong senses of both mission-commitment 
and propriety, then tenure protections have important advantages, at 
least if we worry—plausibly—that an agency’s political overseers 
 
 32. See Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, 
Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 875 (2007). 
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might place too little value on those latter qualities, and in some cases 
might view those qualities as a negative, particularly if they lead to 
resistance to the implementation of a partisan agenda. 
B. Salary, Morale, and Working Conditions 
In addition to the rules and practices for hiring, promoting, and 
dismissing civil servants, there is a second cluster of institutional and 
policy decisions with a clear and important influence on the type of 
people who staff the public sector: the formal rules and informal 
practices that affect the conditions of government employment. The 
relevant conditions include both direct, tangible factors like salary and 
benefits, as well as more indirect, intangible factors that influence 
morale and prestige. 
Start with salary and other forms of material compensation like 
health insurance, pensions, and other perks—which for simplicity I 
will just lump together as part of “salary.” The most obvious 
dimension of bureaucratic quality that is affected by salary is 
competence. More capable individuals, all else equal, are able to 
command higher salaries in the private sector than are less capable 
individuals, which means the pay cut associated with choosing a 
public sector job over a private sector job is larger for more competent 
people. (This is less true, however, for aspects of competence that are 
highly job-specific and not easily transferred to the private sector, 
which might imply that the public sector salary needed to retain 
experienced bureaucrats with a lot of job-specific human capital might 
be lower than what is required to retain someone whose talents are 
more portable.) While public sector salaries virtually never match 
private sector salaries for talented individuals, the size of the public-
private wage gap will have an influence, at the margin, on the ability 
of the public sector to attract talent. Thus, all else equal, one should 
expect that raising public sector salaries will increase civil servants’ 
average competence, while low salaries will tend to degrade 
bureaucratic competence. 
A similar argument can be made regarding integrity, though here 
matters are a bit less clear. A classic argument, though raised more 
often in the context of relatively poor countries than in wealthy nations 
like the United States, is that low civil service salaries heighten the 
risk of bureaucratic corruption.33 There are several reasons why this 
 
 33. See Agnes Cornell & Anders Sundell, Money Matters: The Role of Public 
Sector Wages in Corruption Prevention, 98 PUB. ADMIN. 244 (2020); Caroline Van 
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might be so. First, if wages are very low, bureaucrats may supplement 
their incomes through bribes or embezzlement simply to avoid poverty 
(corruption that stems from need rather than greed). Second, and 
relatedly, when bureaucratic salaries are low and enforcement of 
anticorruption rules is relatively lax, bureaucrats may interpret this as 
a signal that the government expects and tacitly condones some degree 
of petty corruption, thus eroding the stigma and perceived legal risk 
of this sort of misconduct. Third, low pay breeds resentment among 
civil servants, especially if others with similar backgrounds are getting 
rich in the private sector. Disgruntled bureaucrats may come to feel 
that they are entitled to take a little (or a lot) extra. Fourth, when 
anticorruption rules are enforced, a bureaucrat found to have behaved 
unethically may lose her job—and the value of that job depends on the 
salary and other benefits that come with it. (Of course, corruption 
might also lead to criminal prosecution, but there are often cases in 
which the evidence is not clear enough to support criminal charges, 
but still enough to lead to dismissal.) For these reasons, many have 
argued that improving public sector integrity entails increasing public 
sector salaries. 
The empirical evidence on this point, however, is unclear. In 
extreme cases, the hypothesis does seem to hold: Where civil service 
wages are below subsistence levels, it is unsurprising that corruption 
is rampant. And while we have fewer examples of countries where 
public sector wages are extremely high, there are a handful—most 
notably Singapore, where public sector wages rival or even exceed 
private sector wages—and in those countries bureaucratic corruption 
levels are generally viewed as quite low.34 But between these 
extremes, the evidence that public sector wages are correlated with 
bureaucratic integrity is equivocal.35 One reason for this may be that 
the range of variation in public sector wages is not large enough to 
make much difference—public sector wages are typically both well 
above subsistence levels but well below private sector wages for 
comparable jobs—and variance within the usual range may not matter 
 
Rijckeghem & Beatrice Weder, Bureaucratic Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: 
Do Wages in the Civil Service Affect Corruption, and by How Much?, 65 J. DEV. 
ECON. 307, 308 (2001). 
 34. See Jianlin Chen, Curbing Rent-Seeking and Inefficiency with Broad 
Takings Powers and Undercompensation: The Case of Singapore from a Givings 
Perspective, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. ASS’N 1, 51 (2010). 
 35. See generally Carl Dahlstrom et al., The Merit of Meritocratization: 
Politics, Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of Corruption, 65 POL. RES. 
Q. 656 (2012). 
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that much. Another possible explanation is that higher salaries may 
attract more materialistic individuals, and such individuals might be 
more tempted to supplement their incomes still further.36 That 
hypothesis does not seem terribly persuasive, however: Given that 
public sector salaries, at least for highly skilled people, are almost 
always well below private sector salaries, it is hard to see how raising 
public sector salaries, even by a healthy percentage, would be 
sufficient to attract an influx of applicants who are in it for the money 
and for that reason are significantly more corruptible. 
That said, higher salaries may have an indirect effect on what I 
have called commitment, and what the political science and public 
management literatures generally refer to as “intrinsic motivation” or 
“public service motivation.”37 (The concepts are a bit different, but 
here they overlap.) Consider a set of talented individuals choosing 
between a public sector career and a private sector career. To keep the 
example simple, suppose each individual is motivated by a 
combination of two factors: the salary differential and the “career 
satisfaction” differential. The former is determined by the gap between 
the private sector wage and the (lower) public sector wage. The latter 
is determined by how much happier the individual believes she would 
be working in the public sector rather than the private sector. Some 
individuals get no more intrinsic satisfaction from public sector work 
than from private sector work—a job is a job—and those individuals 
would always prefer a private sector career if they can get it. Others, 
though, would get more intrinsic satisfaction from public sector work, 
and would be willing to take a government job for lower pay if that 
intrinsic career satisfaction is strong enough. Those with the strongest 
sense of mission-commitment—those who think that the agency’s 
work is very important, and that by taking a job there they would be 
doing good in the world—are willing to accept the largest salary gap 
to work in the public sector. So, when public sector salaries are very 
low, the applicant pool will consist in part of those who cannot get 
private sector jobs (the competence problem noted earlier), but also of 
those who have such a strong sense of commitment to the agency’s 
 
 36. See generally Sebastian Barfort et al., Sustaining Honesty in Public 
Service: The Role of Selection, 11 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 96 (2019). 
 37. Yannis Georgellis et al., Crowding Out Intrinsic Motivation in the Public 
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1200 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
mission that they are willing to work there for much less than they 
could make in the private sector. Increasing public sector salaries 
might well improve the civil service applicant pool on the dimension 
of competence for the reasons discussed earlier, but, among the highly 
capable applicants in the pool, the average level of commitment to the 
agency’s mission might well be lower. In the extreme case, where 
public sector salaries equal or even exceed private sector salaries, 
applicants for public sector jobs would not have any higher intrinsic 
motivation to advance the agency’s mission than do applicants for 
private sector jobs. Of course, there may be other ways to screen for 
mission-commitment, as discussed previously, but they are likely 
imperfect. So there may be some optimal public-private sector wage 
gap that balances the trade-off between attracting competent 
bureaucrats (which militates in favor of higher public sector salaries) 
and hiring committed bureaucrats (which suggests a reason for public 
sector salaries to be somewhat lower). In practice, the public-private 
sector wage gap is already so large at higher levels (lawyers, 
managers, scientists, economists, etc.) that I doubt that even large 
increases in civil service pay would have much effect on the mission-
commitment of those who want to work in the public sector, but this 
possibility is at least worth considering. 
In addition to salary and other material benefits, there are various 
forms of non-monetary compensation that can help the public sector 
attract and retain capable individuals. As noted in the previous section, 
tenure protections are a form of non-monetary compensation for 
bureaucrats (as they are for professors): most people would be willing 
to take a lower salary in exchange for higher job security, though how 
much lower depends on a range of factors, including one’s risk 
aversion and self-confidence. Another form of non-monetary 
compensation is a job’s social status or prestige. Admittedly, this is 
not the sort of thing that formal laws or institutions directly affect. But 
political leaders, commentators, and others employ rhetoric and 
symbolic actions that affect public sector morale. For example, as this 
Article’s introduction noted, it is all too common for politicians and 
commentators to engage in bureaucrat-bashing. Criticism of 
government agencies is of course entirely legitimate, and government 
officials are for that reason also fair game. But that said, the way we 
talk about not only government agencies, but the people who staff 
them, may have an indirect, though potentially consequential, impact 
on the prestige of serving as a government official, which in turn may 
affect the quality of the bureaucracy. Talented and idealistic young 
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people may find the idea of being a “public servant” attractive, but 
nobody wants to be a “faceless bureaucrat.” 
Furthermore, as just discussed in the salary context, the intrinsic 
satisfaction of public service may be one of the most important forms 
of non-monetary compensation that can attract highly capable people 
into government. Institutions, policies, and practices may affect the 
degree of such satisfaction in many ways. Perhaps most significant is 
the degree of autonomy and influence that civil servants have over the 
policy issues they care about. As I noted in Part I, there are good 
reasons why we might want bureaucrats to have some degree of 
autonomous influence over policy, and I suggested some of the 
individual qualities that might lead bureaucrats to be more willing and 
able to play such a role. Here I want to explore the complementary but 
distinct notion that the laws, policies, or practices that determine the 
extent of civil servants’ influence over policy outcomes may have a 
substantial effect on the kinds of people who choose to seek out those 
jobs. 
Think about it this way: Suppose we adopted the strong form of 
the “transmission belt” conception of bureaucrats’ proper role and 
designed our institutions accordingly. In this world, civil servants (at 
least those below the senior political appointee level) do not help 
formulate policy; they just translate the policies and priorities of their 
political superiors into concrete actions. What kind of person might 
want a job like that? If someone believes strongly in the agency’s 
mission, she may want to take such a position out of a sense that she 
is part of something larger, loyally executing a program she believes 
in. That might be enough to attract talented people at a relatively junior 
level. But administrations come and go, and it is inevitable that over a 
long period of service a career bureaucrat will end up working for 
political principals with policy objectives that differ from each other’s 
and from her own. That is as it should be, but it means that we cannot 
rely solely on a sense of loyalty to the agency’s agenda to convince 
highly capable people to spend their careers as mere “transmission 
belts.” Similarly, people who know and care a lot about a topic will 
generally want to feel like their voices are heard and that their opinions 
matter. Such people will get frustrated in jobs where they are expected 
to salute smartly and execute decisions made by others—especially 
when these talented people could earn a lot more elsewhere. And when 
it comes to the question whether to stay in a public sector job over the 
long term, developing a lot of job-specific expertise that might not be 
so transferable to the private sector, a talented individual may be more 
willing to make such a long-term investment if she thinks the payoff 
1202 Michigan State Law Review  2019 
will be helping to more effectively achieve goals that she shares (at 
least partially).38 
If this assessment is roughly accurate, then insisting on a strong 
version of the transmission belt model of the bureaucracy, in which 
the role of bureaucrats in shaping policy is tightly constrained, is likely 
to degrade the quality of the civil service along several dimensions. 
Diminishing the intrinsic satisfaction associated with public sector 
jobs by reducing even relatively high-level civil servants to mere 
functionaries will make it harder to attract and retain talented people. 
Those who do take public sector jobs will have weaker incentives to 
develop substantial job-specific expertise if they feel like that 
expertise will only serve to advance the agendas of others, rather than 
to serve policy goals that the civil servants themselves have a hand in 
shaping. And the kinds of people who care deeply about an agency’s 
mission are also more likely to place a high value on being able to 
advance that mission in a way that seems sensible, and to bristle at the 
idea that they must entirely subordinate their own sense of the 
agency’s responsibilities to decisions made by their political masters. 
Therefore, even those who do not share my sense that a semi-
autonomous role for the career civil service in policymaking is 
generally good for the nation might nevertheless need to consider the 
possibility that making some concessions along these lines might be 
necessary to attract the kinds of capable people we need for the 
bureaucracy to function effectively. To put the basic idea another way, 
since we cannot or will not pay senior public servants enough money 
to compete with the private sector, we should give them jobs in which 
they feel like they are helping to shape public policy in a meaningful 
way. That sort of policy influence is a kind of non-monetary 
compensation that helps make the public sector more competitive in 
attracting talented people, and has the added benefit of 
disproportionately attracting those who have the strongest sense of 
dedication to their agency’s mission. 
Now, this all assumes that the people in power actually want an 
effective bureaucracy. They may not. Indeed, they may deliberately 
adopt strategies designed to weaken the bureaucracy by changing its 
personnel—reducing not only the average level of mission-
commitment, but also competence, in order to reduce the scope and 
effectiveness of government regulation without actually changing 
formal law or policy. The basic approach, which I will call the 
“hollowing out” strategy, would look something like this: Suppose a 
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new administration, hostile to “big government,” wants to push policy 
in a deregulatory direction. There are a variety of legitimate means for 
doing this, including pressing Congress to pass deregulatory 
legislation or, if that proves infeasible, shifting policy and 
enforcement priorities within the permissible bounds of the existing 
legal framework. But these policy tools might not be viewed as fully 
satisfactory by an administration bent on deregulation, for three 
reasons. First, sometimes existing statutory mandates require 
regulatory action. Second, it might sometimes be too politically costly 
to overtly retract or weaken certain regulations, or to announce a 
policy of non-enforcement. Third, an administration thinking about 
the long term would want to lock in its deregulatory policy shift in a 
way that will persist even if the other party wins the next election. So, 
what else can the anti-regulatory administration do? One possibility is 
that the administration can make the agency professional staff’s lives 
so miserable that they leave. This can be done through formal means—
restricting their autonomy, forcing them to work on meaningless or 
counterproductive tasks, depriving them of resources, and so forth—
and through informal means like denigrating their work and treating 
them with disrespect. When this happens, talented people will start to 
depart, taking their years of experience and expertise with them. This 
degrades the capacity of the agency, possibly for years to come. The 
agency becomes less effective, and that is the point. This “hollowing 
out” strategy may be more important, and dangerous, than has been 
fully appreciated. One particularly pernicious feature of this strategy, 
in addition to its lack of transparency, is that it tends to feed on itself, 
because as good people leave, the jobs of those who remain become 
even more unpleasant, making them likely to look for exit options as 
well. 
That last point relates to a larger observation concerning working 
conditions and morale in government agencies (and elsewhere): Like 
attracts like, a fact that will tend to give rise to virtuous and vicious 
circles with respect to the kinds of people who staff our civil service.39 
Consider a talented, honest person who is deeply committed to, say, 
environmental protection, and who has a strong sense of professional 
propriety. Such an individual would be more likely to want to work at 
the EPA if that agency is staffed mainly by similar sorts of people. She 
would be less likely to want to go work for an EPA staffed by 
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incompetent partisan hacks. A positive agency culture can therefore 
be self-sustaining, while a bad agency culture can be very difficult to 
fix without significant effort and investment. 
C. The Revolving Door  
Another cluster of laws and rules that might affect the quality (or 
qualities) of our civil servants are those that regulate the movement of 
individuals between government careers and careers in the private 
sector—the so-called “revolving door.” The revolving door issue has 
attracted a great deal of attention and worry, mainly focused on how 
movement between the public and private sectors may create conflicts 
of interest (not necessarily in the narrow legal sense) that might distort 
government decision-making in undesirable ways.40 There are various 
rules in place to address these concerns, and many others have been 
proposed.41 But how we regulate the revolving door may have 
consequences for the kinds of people who staff our public 
bureaucracies. (There are also issues related to the revolving door at 
higher levels of government, but here, as elsewhere, my focus is 
mainly on career civil servants rather than elected officials or senior 
political appointees. Some of what I have to say here might apply to 
these more senior officials, but some of it may not.) 
It might be useful, at the outset, to distinguish between the 
revolving door’s two directions. Although commentators often speak 
of the revolving door as if it were one thing—indeed, the metaphor 
itself implies regular cycling of the same people in and out and in and 
out of government—the concerns related to “revolving in” (moving 
from the private sector to public service) might be quite different from 
the concerns implicated by “revolving out” (from public service to the 
private sector). Indeed, some people “revolve out” of government 
without ever revolving back in, while sometimes (though probably 
less frequently) people “revolve in,” leaving the private or nonprofit 
sector for a career government job, and never revolve back out. This 
distinction between revolving in and revolving out is also useful 
because the regulation of entry into government service (in an attempt 
to address concerns about “revolving in”) might have quite different 
consequences for the quality of the civil service, on various 
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dimensions, than does the regulation of what former public servants 
can do after they exit (regulations that are meant to address concerns 
about “revolving out”). Therefore, the discussion below will consider 
each type of regulation separately, though as I will discuss more in a 
moment, the issues are linked in important ways. 
Consider first revolving out: the movement of individuals from 
public sector jobs to private sector jobs. The most prominent concern 
raised by critics of revolving out is that public servants’ interest in 
securing a future private sector job will affect how they exercise their 
government responsibilities in ways that are detrimental to public 
welfare and the agency’s mission. We might worry, for example, that 
an SEC regulator who hopes to work for an investment bank in a few 
years might be too solicitous of the interests of a particular bank, or of 
the banking sector in general, so as not to alienate potential future 
employers. Another concern is that if affluent private interests hire 
former public servants in order to take advantage of their connections 
with their former colleagues, the firms or organizations that are able 
to make these hires will have an unfair advantage in lobbying the 
agency. For these and other reasons, we may want to impose some 
limits on when, how, and for whom former government bureaucrats 
can work in the private sector. Such regulations might vary in strength 
from relatively mild cooling-off periods to more draconian bans from 
certain lines of work, and the breadth of these regulations might range 
from narrow (limited to certain issues that the former public servant 
directly worked on while in government) to expansive (for example, 
covering any matters handled by the ex-bureaucrat’s former agency). 
How might such restrictions, whatever their other effects, 
influence the kinds of people who are likely to hold public sector jobs? 
One advantage of restrictions on post-government private sector 
employment is that they might tend to produce a public service 
applicant pool that has proportionally more individuals who are fully 
committed to public service careers, and who intend to remain in their 
civil service posts for an extended period of time, investing in job-
specific skills and expertise. For someone who intends to stay in public 
service for a long time, restrictions on post-government employment 
will not matter much, and will be discounted accordingly. But those 
who intend to stay in government only for a few years, getting some 
useful experience and a line on their CV before “cashing out” by going 
to the private sector, might be discouraged if there are stringent limits 
on post-government employment or lengthy cooling off periods.  
While this is an advantage, restrictions on post-government 
employment may also have disadvantages with respect to the kinds of 
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people who are attracted to public sector jobs. First, as emphasized 
above, public sector jobs generally do not pay as well as comparable 
private sector jobs, and this pay gap is largest for those who are most 
talented (or at least those who appear the most talented to the market). 
It is unrealistic to expect the U.S. government to be willing to pay 
agency officials salaries commensurate with the social value of their 
work. Yet the government is still able to attract a great many extremely 
capable people—people who are taking a substantial pay cut relative 
to what they could make in the private sector. One reason the 
government is able to do this is that these people know that they can 
exit in a few years and take a high-paying private sector job, and that 
the salary they will be able to command in the private market will be 
substantially larger as a result of their government experience. A 
hotshot young lawyer might be more willing to go work as a DOJ 
prosecutor for the first decade or so of her career, despite the lower 
salary, in part because she anticipates that later on she will be able to 
move to a law firm for much higher pay. If she were prohibited from 
doing so (or if there were other sorts of limitations that reduced the 
economic value of making the jump), she might eschew government 
service from the start, and simply pursue a private sector career.42 
Note that the back-and-forth arguments here parallel the 
previous discussion of the costs and benefits, from a recruiting 
perspective, of higher public sector salaries: Paying bureaucrats lower 
salaries makes it harder to attract those with high competence, but may 
help select for those who care most about the agency’s mission. This 
parallel is not coincidental: restrictions on post-government 
employment function in part as the equivalent of a salary reduction. 
But restrictions on post-government employment may have 
additional effects on things like bureaucratic competence, because a 
government employee’s market value in the private sector may depend 
on how she invests her time and energy during her time in the public 
sector. A former government lawyer, for example, is likely more 
valuable to a private law firm if that lawyer proved herself to be highly 
capable in her government job.43 Here, the previous discussion of the 
relative portability of the skills and experience one might develop in a 
public sector job again becomes relevant. All else equal, a civil servant 
who anticipates making the jump to the private sector will have 
stronger incentives to invest in portable skills, both in absolute terms 
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and relative to investment in non-portable skills.44 The former effect—
greater overall investment in skill development—is likely a good thing 
all else equal, while the latter effect—greater emphasis on the 
development of portable relative to non-portable skills—may be good 
or bad, depending on the particular job and skill sets in question. 
Furthermore, turning back to the mission-commitment part of 
the equation, restrictions on post-government employment may 
increase the average bureaucrat’s commitment to the agency’s mission 
not only through the effect on the composition of the applicant pool at 
the front end, but also through a second mechanism: By increasing the 
average bureaucrat’s expected tenure with the government agency, 
such restrictions might strengthen civil servants’ sense of connection 
and identification with their agency. Officials who anticipate being at 
an agency for a long time—who see public service as their career, not 
as a waystation—are more likely to identify with the agency, to be 
personally invested in the agency’s success in its mission, and to care 
about the agency’s long-term institutional health and position. This is 
not to say that we would not see plenty of public servants who care 
deeply about their agency’s mission under a system with fewer 
restrictions on post-government employment and higher public sector 
turnover. But as a relative matter, those public servants who anticipate 
being at the agency for a long time, and who are surrounded by 
similarly-situated colleagues, are likely to develop a stronger sense of 
commitment to the agency’s mission than are those government 
employees who start off with an eye on the door, or perhaps one foot 
already out of it. 
In sum, while there are lots of other effects that would need to 
be considered, the main trade-off with respect to the impact of post-
government employment restrictions on the quality of agency 
bureaucrats is basically a trade-off between competence (at least in 
some forms) and commitment. Such restrictions may make it harder 
to attract very talented people to government service and may weaken 
incentives to cultivate and demonstrate exceptional skills while in 
those positions. On the other hand, these limits also mean that, all else 
equal, those who seek government employment are more likely to start 
with a strong sense of commitment to the agency’s mission, and that 
sense of commitment is likely to grow stronger given that the post-
employment restrictions tend to encourage remaining in public service 
for a long time, perhaps permanently. It is impossible to say anything 
general about how to resolve this trade-off, as so much depends on the 
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details of particular contexts. But the trade-off itself appears to be one 
that would appear in many settings. 
The same sort of trade-off likely exists—though the mechanisms 
are somewhat different—when we consider possible restrictions on 
movement in the other direction: “revolving in” from the private sector 
to public service. On the one hand, perhaps the most significant 
concern that might justify measures to limit or discourage revolving 
in, at least from certain jobs or sectors, is that individuals might 
identify more with their former non-governmental employers than 
with the agency, and this sympathy to one’s old industry and 
colleagues might influence the public servant’s decision-making. This 
need not be deliberate or nefarious. It might simply be the case that 
people often come to share the worldviews of those with whom they 
spend a lot of time. If you are a banker, and you spend all your time 
hanging out with bankers, then you see the world from a banker’s 
perspective. That does not necessarily change (or at least does not 
change quickly) if you go to work for the Treasury Department or the 
SEC. (Some scholars sometimes describe this phenomenon as a form 
of “epistemic capture,” distinct from the more familiar and materialist 
forms of regulatory capture.45) Of course, everyone who enters 
government service, except for those who come in straight out of 
school or from some other government employment, was previously 
employed somewhere else. But critics have expressed concerns that 
individuals who come from certain professional backgrounds—
particularly working or lobbying for the industry the agency is 
supposed to regulate—are especially likely to have too little 
commitment to the agency’s mission, especially when that mission 
clashes with the interests of their previous employers.46 
This problem is exacerbated if those who “revolve in” to 
government from the private sector typically “revolve out” within a 
few years. An individual who shifts from the private sector to the 
government with the understanding and expectation that she will 
remain in public service for a very long time, perhaps the rest of her 
career, is more likely to shift her identification and orientation from 
her old private sector role to her new public sector role than is someone 
who rotates into the public sector but hopes and expects to cycle back 
into the industry from whence she came within a few years. Thus 
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while I have separated the “revolving out” and “revolving in” issues 
in the discussion here, they are linked in this respect. 
So, figuring out some way to limit or discourage individuals with 
certain sorts of professional backgrounds from entering the public 
sector might help avoid a situation where large numbers of agency 
personnel, particularly in more senior positions, are insufficiently 
committed to the agency’s mission due to excessive sympathy with 
their former employers and colleagues. But such limitations may, all 
else equal, lower the average competence of public servants, at least 
if some forms of relevant competence tend to correlate with prior work 
experience in the sectors or industries that the agency regulates. After 
all, if the SEC wants to regulate the banks, it needs people who really 
understand the banking sector at a granular level, and people with that 
level of understanding are disproportionately likely to work in banks. 
(As Senator Phil Gramm colorfully put it back in 1989, the idea that 
we want to avoid appointing government officials who previously 
worked in the regulated sector implies that our ideal public servant 
“would be a fellow that just came in on a turnip truck who would agree 
not to ever make a decision related to turnips or trucks.”47) In some 
areas this may not be all that much of a problem, because there are a 
sufficient number of experts in the relevant technical fields who were 
not previously employed by the sector to be regulated. But in other 
areas this will be more of a difficulty. As with the discussion of the 
revolving out problem, it is impossible to say anything general about 
the right way to manage this trade-off. Figuring out the correct 
approach would depend on the details of particular contexts in which 
the issue might arise. But the basic dilemma likely crops up in many 
different areas. 
CONCLUSION 
The study of the administrative state, in the United States and 
elsewhere, has generally focused on “big picture” institutional 
questions regarding things like the design of accountability, oversight, 
and coordination mechanisms, as well as longstanding debates about 
the bureaucracy’s appropriate size, scope, and powers. These issues 
are of fundamental importance. But the focus on these broad 
questions, coupled with the understandable emphasis on the struggle 
for control at the highest levels (involving the President, Congress, the 
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agencies’ top leadership, and the courts), has perhaps obscured the 
extent to which the quality of our government depends substantially 
on the characteristics of the individual human beings who staff it—not 
only the cabinet secretaries and agency heads, but the mass of senior 
career civil servants and the appointed deputies and assistants who 
may not be household names even among the most dedicated political 
junkies, but who are collectively responsible for much of what our 
government does and how well it performs. 
My goal in this short Article has been to emphasize, first, that if 
we want our government to function effectively, and to advance some 
normatively attractive notion of the “public interest” (recognizing but 
bracketing longstanding debates about how to understand that 
concept), then we should try to design our laws and institutions so as 
to attract, retain, and empower public servants with a set of desirable 
qualities. In addition to obvious and uncontroversial qualities like 
competence and honesty, we should also prefer public servants who 
exhibit a high level of commitment to the mission of their agencies, 
coupled with a strong sense of propriety, both in the sense of 
professional propriety (performing analysis that meets high 
professional standards even if it produces results that are politically 
unpalatable) and bureaucratic propriety (following the right 
procedures, crossing the t’s and dotting the i’s). These latter qualities 
are not only likely to contribute to public servants’ overall 
performance, but are more likely to establish the civil service as a 
bulwark against the excessive politicization (in the bad, partisan sense) 
of the administrative state. My second objective has been to sketch, 
briefly and admittedly superficially, some of the ways that the quality 
of our public service, along these various dimensions, might be 
affected by laws and policies related to things like the appointment, 
promotion, and removal systems; compensation and working 
conditions; the extent to which public servants have a degree of 
autonomy and meaningful input into the decision-making process; and 
how we choose to regulate (or not to regulate) the “revolving door” 
between the public and private sectors. Even this cursory treatment 
illuminates some challenging trade-offs, and more generally indicates 
the need to pay closer attention to how our institutional, legal, and 
policy choices—including certain choices that are not, on their face, 
about influencing the makeup of the civil service—may have a 
substantial effect on the quality (or qualities) of our public servants, 
and hence on the quality of our government. 
 
